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SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT,
A DEUS EX MACHINA IN THE TRAGIC INTERPRETATION
OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
GEORGE J. AlEXANDER*
I
Good taste prohibits further maligning the deformed body of law known
as the Robinson-Patman Act.l When it becomes the subject of judicial con
troversy, allowances are normally made for the apparent incongruity of its
appendages and charitable attempts are made to view it as though it were
properly developed. Some belated surgical treatment has, in fact, had some
effect in producing better co-ordination.2 On the whole, though, malig
nancies thrive and the prognosis is poor. Experts urge euthanasia as the best
alternative both for the antitrust family as a whole and for the ill-conceived
offspring.3
On the other hand, hardly a voice is raised against the antitrust power
granted the Federal Trade Commission in section 5 of the act creating the
commission. The simplicity of expression that interdicted "unfair methods
of competition," coupled with general agreement that unfair methods
should be eradicated, make it difficult to find fault with the principle of
the section.
Until recently, the Trade Commission, which has taken primary respon
sibility for the enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act and, of course,
has exclusive authority over the development of the Trade Commission
Act, has used both relatively independently. The Robinson-Patman Act
has been developed and expanded until today it approaches rendering un
lawful any financial concession made by a seller to some, but not all, of his
customers. In order to accomplish that expansion, the Trade Commission
has had to interpret the act very strictly; and, predictably, strict construc
tion of a poorly drafted act has led to at least one absurd loophole. The
Commission has chosen to use section 5 as a deus ex machina to preclude
the undesired result. In so doing, it has raised the question of the future
of both acts. The contrast between the broad, simple lines of section 5 and
the prolix, inarticulate construction of Robinson-Patman throws into dra
matic relief some of the problems of each. This article will briefly sketch
the acts as they interrelate and suggest some of the problems raised by their
joint application to the problem of discriminatory pricing.
• Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law, Syracuse 10, New
York.
1. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)-(f) (1958). "The Robinson·Patman Act has
been belabored
by speakers too numerous to count." The Federal Trade Commis
sion in I96o-Apologia Pro Vita Nostra, Statement by Earl W. Kitner, then Chairman of
the FTC before the New York State Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, Jan. 26,
1961.
2. E.g., notes 16 through 20 infra and accompanying text.
3. E.g., Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at
Robinson·Patman,60 YALE L.J. 929 (1951).
•

.

•
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II
In 1935, the Federal Trade Commission was awaiting an anti-price
discrimination amendment of rather simple proportions.4 What it got in
stead (the Robinson-Patman Act) was a very extensively developed section
which appeared, at first glance, to be capable of accomplishing all that the
Commission had wanted and more. Even before its first application, how
ever, the language of the act seemed awkward at best. For example, section
2(a)5 prohibited discriminating in price without clarifying whether to "dis
criminate" meant more than to charge a different price. The section was
limited to "commodities of like grade and quality." Fortunately "of like
grade and quality" never developed into the formidable cavity that the
word "like" had introduced into the earlier Interstate Commerce Commis
sion Act.6 The clause concerning the requisite injury to commerce was in
articulately formed.7 By comparison with other legislation, however, it was
not a bad sub-section, forming a good nucleus for the act.
The sub-sections were more deformed. Section 2(b)8 devoted 125 words
4. The Federal Trade Commission had studied the problems created by the emerg
ing national chain stores and had requested an amendment to section 2 of the Clayton
Act.Its proposal was contained in a bill, introduced by Rep. Mapes, which would have
made it unlawful to discriminate in the price of commodities, either directly or indirectly,
"unfairly or unjustly." In the wake of the fallen Blue Eagle, Schecter Poultry v. United
States, 295 U.S.495 (1935), the "unfairly or unjustly" standard was feared too vague and
abandoned by the Committee.Hearings Before the House Committee of the Judiciary on
Bills to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Congo 1st Sess.(1935).
S C.§ 13(a) (1958):
5.49 Stat.1526 (1936), 15 U. .
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such com
modities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any
Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other
place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such dis
crimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing [herein]
contained ... shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differ
ing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold
or delivered....
6.Interstate Commerce Commission Act § 2, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49
U.S. C. § 2 (1958), prohibits receiving from a customer "a greater or less compensation
for any service rendered ... for doing ...a like and contemporaneous service ... under substantially similar circumstances ...
" than received from other customers. ICC V.
Baltimore and O.R.R.
, 145 U. S. 26 3 (1892) (different rates could be applied for group
travel over same route since not like service as individual travel). For interpretation of
"commodities of like grade and quality" under the
Robinson-Patman Act see: An'y
GEN. NAT'L CO�IM.ANTITRUST REP. 156-159 (1955).
7.The Robinson-Patman amendment appended the words : "or to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination, or with the customers of either of them," to the pre
existing standard of substantial lessening of competition or tendency toward monopoly.
The meaning of the words is still disputed. See: Anheuser-Busch V. FTC, TRADE REG.
REP. (1961 Trade Cas.) � 69904 (7th Cir.January 25, 1961).
8.49 Stat.1526 (1936 ), 15 U.S.C.§ 13(b) (1958):
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that
there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the
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to an explanation of the allowable affirmative defenses to the prohibited
conduct. This relatively simple segment was so poorly conceived that the
Trade Commission and the Supreme Court have disagreed to the present
day whether the mentioned affirmative defenses were complete defenses9 and
many cases have been required to resolve that the sub-section did not lower
the government's burden of proof of competitive injury.10 In addition,
since the section referred to "discrimination in price or services or facilities
furnished" whereas 2(a) referred only to discrimination "in price," the
sub-section seemed broader in scope than 2(a). Taken literally, the section
granted an afative defense to two of the four types of discriminatory
conduct prohibited, although there appeared no rational basis for singling
out those two.
Section 2(C)11 was so complex in its wording that courts would ulti
mately find that it almost absolutely prohibited the payment of brokerage
fees where the recipient was identified with the buyer.12 Worse yet, the sub
section, inexplicably, prohibited the receiving of the outlawed fee as well
as its granting. Since neither 2(d) nor 2(e) contained a clause directed at
receipt and since the provisions of 2(f) only prohibited knowing receipt
of a "discrimination in price,"13 the added flourish would complicate the
interpretation of the later sections.
burden of rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing justification
shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justi
fication shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an
order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing [herein]
contained ...shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima facie case thus made by
showing that his lower price or the furnishing Qf services or facilities to any
purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price Qf
a competitor, or the senices or facilities furnished by a competitor.
9. Standard Oil v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951) (complete defenses); Exquisite Form
Brassiere, Inc.TRADE REG.REP. � 29195 (FTC Oct. 31, 1960) (holding 2(b) inapplicable to
a 2(d) charge included a gratuitous barb: "In that case [Standard Oil v. FTC, supra]

despite a legislative history clearly indicating that Congress felt that the defense was to

be construed as strictly procedural, the Supreme Court held that the language of section
2(b) was clear and provided a complete defense to a charge of price discrimination."
[d. at :37588, 37589 (Emphasis supplied).
10. The Trade Commission contended that the words: "prima facie case thus
made ... " established that it could prove violation, prima facie, without proof of com
petitive injury.This contention was seemingly laid to rest in Automatic Canteen v.FTC,
346 U.S. 61 (1953).
11. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1958):
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a com
mission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu
thereof, e.xcept for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of
goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or
to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermedi
ary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect con
trol. of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such com
pensation is so granted or paid.
12. An'y GEN. NAT'L COMlI. ANTITRUST REP. 188-189 (1955)' Even independent
brokers seem to fall within the ambit of the sub-section under certain circulltances,
FTC v. Henry Brock. 363 u.s. 166 (1g60), though there is some question as to the
propriety of blaming the statute in this regard.
13. 49 Stat.1526 (1936), 15 U.s .C. § 13(d)-(f) (1958).
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Section 2(d),14 by contrast, seemed clear indeed, but 2(e)15 more than

compensated for the apparent clarity. While the two prior sections care
fully began by prohibiting payment by a person engaged in commerce,
2(e) ignored the commerce qualification entirely and added the verb "dis
criminate" apparently to qualify the operative verb "furnish," thus raising
at least two questions: in light of the exclusion of "discriminate" in the two
prior sections, did 2(e) require something more than a mere furnishing
and, by the same token, would 2(a)'s use of "discriminate" in "discriminate
in price" have to be re-examined in light of the implications of its use in
2(e). Furthermore, 2(e) in referring to the recipient of the services called
him "purchaser," leaving the reader to wonder how this person differed
from the "customer" who was the recipient in 2(d). Finally, the omission of
limiting words seemed to make the section applic
: able whenever a service
was accorded to any purchaser regardless of whether that purchaser was
competing with the other purchasers from the supplier.
Of all the sub-sections, 2(e) was probably the most inexcusably sloppy.
That judicial interpretation made it workable suggests that the ultimate
degeneration of the other sub-sections might have been more preventable.
In fact, viewing the miracle that replaced "purchaser" with "customer"16
and "accorded" with "available"17 appended the commerce qualification18
and the competing customer requirement19 and shrank the "discriminate"
provision to insignificance,2o it is difficult to understand the limited use of
the judicial scalpel on adjacent verbiage.
Had the Federal Trade Commission initially taken a long-range view,
it would likely have decided that the act could be adapted to the purpose

14· 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 u.s.c. § 13(d) (1958):
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for
the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such per
son in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for any
services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with
the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodi·
ties manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such payment
or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other custom
ers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities.
15. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1958) :
It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser
against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with
or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contribut
ing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing,
handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms
not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms.
16. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945) a
careful opinion, discussing both sub·section (d) and (e) uses the terms "customer" and
"purchaser" interchangeably. This interchangeability has, apparently, never been ques
tioned.
17. No case to date has suggested any difficulty in finding the two terms synonymous.
18. Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946); Elizabeth Arden Sales
Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945).
19· Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co. 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949).
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950).
20. n:C v. Simplicity Patte!n C<?, 360 U.S. 55 �}959). "Dis c;imi�ate :' in 2(a) has
also been mterpreted so as to dIVest It of overtones. . . . [A] prIce dIscrimination
is merely a price difference." FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960).
•
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of the less complex proposal, giving the commission a rather flexible tool in
discriminatory pricing. In fact, the act seems better adapted to such inter
pretation than to the one ultimately forced upon it. Section 2 begins, as it
began prior to the Robinson-Patman amendment, by declaring it unlawful
"either directly or indirectly to discriminate in price" under certain cir
cumstances. It would have seemed unduly restrictive for a court to have
held, prior to the addition of the other sub-sections, that a firm which gave
selected customers a discount in the form of services was not indirectly dis
criminating in price against other purchasers. More controversial still
would have been a holding that labeling the discount "brOkerage" when,
in fact, no brokerage service was performed, would take the transaction be
yond the purview of the section. Since the quoted language is apparently
sufficient to cover the collateral evils prohibited by the later sub-sections in
the present act and since, in fact, "indirectly" makes little sense if 2(a) is
taken as limited entirely to pl'ice differences, 2(a) could quite easily have
been interpreted as controlling the later specific enumerations of indirect
discriminations. Thus, with a single bold incision to the heart, the sub
sections might have been made to function in coordination. All forms of
discriminatory sales would have been judged by the same standards and
most of the problems which were later to plague the act could have been
avoided.21
Under the above suggested interpretation, the language of 2(b) relating
to "discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished" would be
interpreted as synonymous with direct and indirect price discrimination
in the prior sub-section. Thus, the justification based on meeting a com
petitor's price would be uniformly applicable whether the violation alleged
was a discriminatory price or another form of discrimination. All prohibi
tions in the act would be modified by the competitive injury standard
and cost justification defense of the first sub-section and, conversely, re
cipients of all types of discriminatory allowances, whether in price or its
equivalent, would be governed by sub-section (£).22
The Trade Commission decided on an alternative approach. Each
sub·section, treated without regard to the whole, could be developed to
accomplish specific tasks more easily. Blinded to the competitive injury re
quirement, (c), (d) and (e) could be made to strike out at brokerage and
advertising allowances, striking them down without regard to any plea
that in use they were really competitively innocuous.2 3 By a careful excision
21. An alternative approach to the same conclusion is suggested by Loughlin, In 
vestigation and Trial of Robinson·Patman Act Cases Before the Federal Trade Commission
(Part I), 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 741, 776 n.1 70 (1959). But see Morton and Cotton, Robinson
Patman Act-Anti-Trust or Anti·Consumer, 37 MINN. L. REv. 227 (1953) (suggesting that

the act was conceived as it has been interpreted and that the competitive injury stand
ard of 2(l!) was intentional "double· talk").
22. � 2(f) prohibits knowing receipt of a discriminatory price. See note 32 infra.
23. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
,63,1 (1938) (brokerage payment illegal irrespective of effect on competition); accord,
Southgate Brokerage Co., Inc. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
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of 2(d) from the proviso of 2(b), 24 an interpretation calling for an incredible
predilection for literalness, the act could be made impervious to the meeting
of competition defense when advertising allowances were compensated
rather than furnished.25 By comparison to the skill required to accomplish
this result, the prior removal of 2(C) from the scope of 2(a)26 seems far
less dramatic than it must have seemed at the time it was accomplished.
The result was, of course, the development of an act far stronger than it
would otherwise have been, but also far more grotesque.
Much of the abuse heaped upon the act is traceable to the effect of
its interpretational development. While the act was bound to the considera
tion of competitive injury, it bore a relationship to its brethren antitrust
laws that could not be denied. Although going much further than they
did in prohibiting some types of potentially monopolizing conduct, it was
nonetheless attuned to the Sherman Act27 prohibitions as strengthened by
the Clayton Act28 and Trade Commission Act29 emphasis on earlier enforce
ment. '''hen it became blinded to competitive injury, and in some cases to
the force of actual competitive pressure on the seller, many abandoned
the act as a traitor to the antitrust family. The results, under present inter
pretation of the act, are truly amazing. The distinctions in result are
traceable to the sub-section which happens to have been chosen to smite
the conduct. A, a manufacturer sells to his favorite customer (F.C.), allow
ing him a five per cent reduction from the usual selling price. If this reduc
tion is treated as a 2(a) offense, A may defend on the basis of lack of com
petitive injury, cost justification or meeting of competition. If it turns out
that no independent broker interceded in the transaction and that five per
cent approximates the usual brokerage fee, A may be condemned sum
marily-and so may F.C.-by classifying the allowance as a false brokerage
fee.ao Without much additional information the action can be classified
an advertising allowance and thus struck down again.s1 Probably the most
peculiar aspect of such a curious result is that as the government begins to
774 ( 1945); Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 625 ( 1940); Oliver Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939); as to sub
sections (2d) and 2(e) tIle Court in FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc. said, "Subsec
tions (c), (d), and (e)
unqualifiedly make unlawful certain business practices other
tIlan price discrimination" 360 U.S. 55, 65 ( 1959) (dictum as to 2(C) and 2(d), holdings as
to 2(e».
24. Note 8 supra. The viable portion removed allowed meeting a competitor's offer.
25. Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. � 29195 (FTC Oct. 31, 1960);
contra, Delmar Constr. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,-F. Supp.-(S.D. Fla. 1961).
26. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.s.
634 (1938).
27. 26 Stat. 209 (1890); as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
28. 38 Stat. 730 ( 19 14); as amended, 15 U.S.C. §� 12-27 ( 1958).
29. 38 Stat. 7 17 ( 19 14); as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4 1-5 1 ( 1958).
30. The FTC has even applied 2(C) provisions to a reduction in seller's salesmen's
commissions where tIle reduction was passed on to the buyer, Thomasville Chair Co.,
No. 7273, FTC, March 15, 196 1.
31. The Attorney General's Committee points out: "Virtually identical trade prac
tices have been termed 'allowances' in one case and 'indirect discriminations' in another."
ATI'y GEN. NAT'L COMM., ANrUST REP. 191-192 ( 1955).
•

•

•

•
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prove facts which would seem to mitigate the undesirability of the conduct,
on the cost justification theory, by proving that the seller was compensating
for at least some service rendered, the defense of cost justification is lost to
the seller and the government is relieved of the burden of proving competi
tive injury. Further confusion is created by the recent assertion by the
Trade Commission that while a seller may provide advertising for favorite
buyers under certain competitive pressures, the meeting of competition
defense is lost if, instead, the seller pays the buyer to provide the identical
services.32
If the Trade Commission were able to enforce 2(a) in all cases where
the sales practices threatened the competitive in�egrity of the relevant
market and found itself powerless to enjoin practices cleverly hidden under
equivalent conduct somewhat beyond the scope of the statute, one might be
disposed to overlook the "nit-picking issues so dear to the hearts of some
scholars" and the "carping and sniping and moaning and groaning by clever
and hard-working members of the Bar" as the last chairman of the Commis
sion proposed.33 In fact, critics charge, the commission has neither con
shtently prohibited the conduct most inimical to the economy nor sought
the giants at whom the antitrust weapons seem aimed.34 What may have
resulted is an act which perpetuates an outdated economic distribution
system for the benefit of unnecessary intermediaries and simultaneously, in
the name of a competitive economy, perpetuates the inefficient whose eradi
cation is the sina qua non of free competition.35
But the monstrous act has an Achilles' heel. By restricting each sub
section to independent interpretation, the prohibition against receipt of
discriminatory allowances (2(£»)36 is limited to price discriminations and
cannot be applied to discriminatory furnishing or compensating of services.
The result is no more horrendous than the other results that come from
the schizophrenic development with one exception. This aberration weakens
rather than strengthens.
Rather than attempt a cure, the Trade Commission abandoned the
act to its weakness and, with pragmatic thoroughness, covered the weakness
with another act: a rejuvenated version of the act which created the Com32. Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. � 29195 (FTC Oct. 3 1, 1960).
33. The Role of Robinson-Patman in the Antitrust Scheme of Things-The Perspec
tive of Enforcement Officials, Statement by Earl W. Kitner, then Chairman, FTC, Before
the Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, 'Washington, D. C., Aug. 30, 1960•
34. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAw 74-78 (1959); Loughlin, Investigation
and Trial Of Robinson-Patman Act Cases Before the Federal Trade Commission (Part II),

A NTITRUST BULL. 45 (1960).
35. The most apparent instance is the insulation of brokers from the competitive
pressures of integrated industries. For a general appraisal of the effect of the law, see ED
WARDS, THI: PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 628.630 ( 1959).
36• 49 Stat. 1526 ( 1936), 15 U.S.C. 13 (f) ( 1958):
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is pro
hibited by this section.
5
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mission.37 If Robinson-Patman is not physically violated by the receipt of
illegal discriminatory allowance, the Commission reasoned, such a

an

receipt, nonetheless, does injury to the spirit of the act. Such spiritual in
jury, in turn, is an "unfair method of competition"38 and thence illegal.
III
The power to suppress unfair methods of competition is one of the
original powers granted to the Trade Commission. It is, probably an al
most ideal grant of administrative power encompassing the minimal pre
judgment of results and allowing the Commission the maximal scope of
application of its expertise. Searching through the legislative history of
the act, one finds that there was general unanimity that the act was designed
to combat an ill-defined grey zone of conduct which Congress felt itself
incapable of interdicting legislatively.39 Hardly any better reason for em
powering an administrative agency to create standards suggests itself.
Despite its careful imprecision, it was to face hostile courts chary of ap
proving any grant of power to the newly conceived administrative agencies,
and, under the doctrine of the Gratz case,40 which usurped the ultimate
power for the courts, it was to go through a
for many years. Even in those early days,
claimed, "The words 'unfair competition'
and their exact meaning is in dispute. It is

somewhat stunted development
when the Supreme Court pro
are not defined by the statute

for the courts not the Commis
sion, ultimately to determine as a matter of law what they include,"41
there seemed little doubt that a violation of the Sherman Act was an
unfair method of competition. A more difficult problem then, and now,
was whether a violation of the Clayton Act42 was also a section 5 violation.
The Clayton Act43 and the Federal Trade Commission Act44 were in
many ways complimentary acts. The former, by its more explicit standards
and its easier test of illegality was phrased to arrest illegal conduct short of
its development into a Sherman Act violation. The Trade Commission Act
was, by the power to prohibit unfair methods of competition, also aimed at
fringe and incipient violations. Read together, they form a considerable bar
rier to the major antitrust problems. Since the Clayton Act was the later of
the two,45 it is, of course, impossible to claim that Clayton Act violations
were considered when the section 5 enforcement power was granted to the
37. Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51
(1958).
38. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a)( I ), 38 Stat. 721, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)( I ) (1958) prohibits: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce. . . .
39. See Montague, Unfair Methods of Competition, 25 YALE L.J. 2 0 (1915).
40. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
41. Id. at 427.
42. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1958).
43. Ibid_
44. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1958).
45. It was passed September 26, 1914 while the Clayton Act was passed on October
15, 1914.
"
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Commission. Since, however, the Congress did not limit the Commission
to acts previously condemned, it should not be too important that it later
brought other acts within the pale of illegality. In fact, a cogent argument
can be made that the Clayton Act, by establishing new antitrust policy, was
also giving direction to the section 5 mandate to eradicate acts deemed
opposed to free competition. Probably the most confusing aspect of the
problem is that the Commission was given the power to enforce the Clay
ton Act,46 never having had a comparable power directly to enforce the
Sherman Act.
To date, the encompassing of Clayton violations under section 5 orders
has not been settled on its own merits. Dictum in Supreme Court cases
would seem to attribute sufficient scope to the Trade Commission Act but
it is difficult to interpret the applicable portions of the relevant opinions.
Perhaps tlle apparent obscurity is an indication that the Court has not, as
yet, turned its full attention to the problem.
In Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC,41 the Court said: "1£ the pur
pose and practice of the [defendants] run counter to the public policy de
clared in the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Federal Trade Commission
has the power to suppress it as an unfair method of competition."48 1£ the
sentence means that the Commission has the power to prohibit acts viola
tive of the purpose while outside the language of the Clayton Act, it is
gratuitous advice in light of the finding that the conduct in question both
violated the spirit of the Sherman Act and the letter of Clayon's section 3.
Even more puzzling, if one is inclined to find a broad recognition of power
in the statement, is the footnote supporting it. The court cites its language
in Beech Nuf49 which reaffirms the Commission's power to prohibit conduct
inimical to the policy of the Sherman Act; it cites the Sherman, Clayton
and Trade Commission Acts, and concludes,

"•

.

.

the Federal Trade

Commission is expressly given authority to enforce the Clayton Act."50
Nothing either in the opinion or in the language of the supporting note
goes directly to the question of present concern.
The next, and last, applicable restatement to come from the Court
came in FTC v. 1'.Iotion Pictw"e Advertising Servo CO.51 In language which
seems to summarize the totality of prior determinations, it said:
It is also clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to
supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act (See Federal Trade
Commission V. Beech·Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453)-to stop in their incipiency act
and practices which, when full blown, would violate both those Acts (see Fashion
Guild V. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457, 463, 466), as well as to condemn
as "unfair methods of competition" existing violations of them. See Federal
Trade Commission V. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 691."'
46.
47·
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

� 11,38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
312 U.S. 457 (1940).
ld. at 463.
FTC v. Beecl!·Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463 no{ (1940).
344 U.S. 392 (1953).
ld. at 394.
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Since the opinion concludes that the unfair method of competltlon
involved in that case was a violation of the Sherman Act, and since even
the dictum quoted only included acts which would violate

both the

Sherman and Clayton Acts when completed, the opinion would be ir
relevant to the instant problem but for Justice Frankfurter's dissent.
An interesting facet of the dissent is that Justice Frankfurter both es
tablishes and criticizes a novel rule of law. He writes, "The Federal Trade
Commission Act was designed, doubtless, to enable the Commission to nip
in the bud practices which, when full blown, would violate the Sherman

or

Clayton Act."53 He finds the rule distasteful: "But it is another thing to
suggest that anything in business activity that may, if unchecked, offend
the particularizations of the Clayton Act may now be reached by the Federal
Trade Commission Act. The curb on the Commission's power, as expressed
by the series of cases beginning with the Gratz case,

supra, so as to leave to

the courts rather than the Commission the final authority in determining
what is an unfair method of competition, would be relaxed, and unbridled
intervention into business practices encouraged."54 The majority opinion
having decided the case on the basis of an actual violation of the Sherman
Act, one wonders why Justice Frankfurter was motivated to flay the dubious
point of law he espoused.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion aside, the only determination of the scope
of power attributable to section 5 in cases dealing solely with actions po
tentially violative of the Clayton Act is the dictum in

Fashion Guild.ll5 It

is submitted that the Court's assertion that section 5 encompasses acts which
"run counter to the public policy declared in the Sherman and Clayton
Acts"56 is correct, but that it means something far different from Justice
Frankfurter's assertion. The provisions of the Clayton Act (Robinson
Patman excepted for

th&

moment) are provisions which the courts have

consistently interpreted as making Sherman Act prohibitions effective at a
time when the danger is merely incipient. To the extent that activities have
been singled out for special treatment, the fact that they were chosen would
seem to indicate a greater Congressional concern with them and it may be
argued that the public antitrust policy has been affected by the emphasis. In
other words, in light of section 3 of the Clayton Act,57 for example, it
might be argued that there is a strong public policy opposing tying and
requirements contracts but, basically, these contracts are either present or
incipient violations of the Sherman Act. So analyzed, there is little novel
about the assertion that the Trade Commission has prohibitory power
and the court's footnote relating to the direct power to enforce the Clayton

53.
54.
55.
56.
57·

ld. at 400'4°1.
ld. at 405.

Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC,

ld. at 463.

312 U.S. 457 ( 1940).

38 Stat. 7 3 1 ( 19 14), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 14 ( 1958). Section 3 prohibits sales
made on condition that the buyer not deal in goods of a -competitor when such trans
actions have the requisite anti-competitive effect.
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Act is meaningful. So analyzed, Justice Frankfurter's fear that the power
granted will be a power to prohibit incipiently incipient conduct is un
justified.
More significantly, requiring a relationship of all antitrust enforcement
to the Sherman Act gives some direction and symmetry to the policies
therein expressed. Again excepting the Robinson-Patman amendments, the
Clayton Act prohibitions supplement and bolster Sherman Act violations,
by prohibiting acts in their incipiency.58 So also, may the power of the
Trade Commission, through section 5, supplement the Sherman Act. To
allow the section 5 power to go beyond the gravitational pull of Sherman,
however, into a nebulous area where an act may become an incipient viola
tion does raise the type of problem adverted to by Justice Frankfurter: "un
bridled intervention into business practices" by the Trade Commission. It
also tends to degenerate the specific provisions of the Clayton Act into
vague guidelines.
To conclude that the Trade Commission has no power to prohibit the
incipient Clayton Act violations, is not to say that it is powerless to act when
a violator has escaped the letter of the Clayton Act and, nonetheless, com 
mitted an act which is fully as anti-competitive. Ultimately, anti-competitive
acts find their way into the broad language of the Sherman Act, and, un
doubtedly, section 5 may legitimately haIt them short of fruition.59
It may be that section 5 has been judicially limited in scope to acts
which are prohibited under the Sherman or Clayton standards of competi
tive injury. At least one writer so reads the early cases.oo Certainly the
Gratz,61 CurtisG2 and Sinclai1-G3 decisions refused to allow a broader scope
to section 5 than would have been applicable had the cases been tried under
the standard of competitive injury expressed in section 3 of the Clayton
Act.6! No court has approved a section 5 antitrust order which was not
founded in conduct found incipiently or actually anti-competitive. The
Trade Commission has, in fact, until very recently, required a showing of
anti-competitive effect at least sufficient to meet the Clayton Act standard
as a prerequisite to invocation of section 5 sanctions.65 A disturbing trend
in the opposite direction is, however, probably in progress.
The Grand Union6G case is a rather good example. In that case an
action was brought against the grocery chain defendant for receipt of dis
criminatory advertising allowances. Neither the trial examiner nor the full
!jS. See Standard Fashions Co. v. l\Iagrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
59. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1940); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
60. Howrey, Utilization by the FTC of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
,let as all Antitrust Law, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 161, 166 (1960).
61. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
62. FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923).
63. FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
64. Note 57 supra.
65. HOlVrey, supra note 60 at 173-175, 178, 179.
66. TRADE REG. REP. � 28980 (Sept. 1, 19OO).
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Commission was disturbed by the fact that, as the Commission had inter
preted the Robinson-Patman Act, receipt of discriminatory advertising
allowance was not a violation of that act. Section 5 was thought sufficiently
applicable. Since, again through its interpretations of the Robinson-Patman
Act, the granting of discriminatory allowances was illegal regardless of the
effect on competition, the order was issued without taking proof of com
petitive injury.
This amazing levitation has to be analyzed to be appreciated. After

Sinclair67 and before Grand Union, the Trade Commission had avoided the
issue of the interplay of section 5 and the Clayton Act, since each decision
which reached the courts could rest on the incipient Sherman Act violation.
Raised in the posture of the Grand Union case, however, the only justifica
tion for section 5 censure was that the act was similar to an act prohibited
by the Clayton Act, specifically, Robinson·Patman section 2 (f). Without
proof of anti-competitive effect, it is difficult to make out a theory of incipi
ent Sherman Act violation. The issue is put squarely. Ironically, the case
arises in a manner which makes it unprofitable for the defendant to appeal
to the courts. Since the Grand Union suppliers who had previously provided
the discriminatory price scale have been ordered to cease and desist under
the letter of Robinson-Patman,68 little advantage could be gained by Grand
Union even if it upset the Trade Commission's ruling. With one masterful
stroke, the Commission h�s both ass�xted a most controversial power and
found an escape from the interpretational limitations of 2(f).
IV
Both the Robinson-Patman Act and section 5 have now been inter
preted in a manner which makes them applicable to acts which may or may
not be anti-competitive. Perhaps this would only be an academic concern
if the issue were being considered by the Trade Commission, which is, after
all, charged with expertise in trade regulation. What is disturbing, how
ever, is that the Commission is apparently applying both acts not as a matter
of its own conclusion that the prohibited conduct is anti-competitive but,
rather, on the basis that it violates a Congressional mandate.
If the courts are still intent on making the antitrust laws consistent, a
motive they have espoused in a number of cases,69 and if the Gratz assertion
that the courts retain the ultimate control over the content of "unfair meth
ods of competition"70 has currency, the time seems propitious for a re
examination. The logical place to begin would seem to be in those places
67. FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
68. Swanee Paper Corp., No. 6927, FTC, April 13, 1960 (order to cease Be desist);
General Mills, Inc., No. 6926, FTC, Sept. 10, 1959 (order to cease Be desist); Judson
Dunaway Corp., No. 6925, FTC, July 24, 1958 (consent order to cease Be desist).
69. E.g., Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953), in which the Court
held it its "duty to reconcile [interpretations of the Robinson·Patman Act] with the
broader antitrust policies that have been laid down by Congress." [d. at 73, 74.
70. Note 40 supra and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 12 Syracuse L. Rev. 328 1960-1961

SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

329

in the Robinson-Patman Act which have become divorced from the main
stream of antitrust: the provision that an illegal act must have an adverse
effect on competition.71 How much progress can be made in that direction,
in light of the numerous cases which have supported the vivisectionist in
terpretation of the act, is not clear. The Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws dispaired of judicial salvation for
2(C)72 and it may be, since that time, 2(d) and 2(e) have shared 2(C)'S fate.73
Certainly, even if the act is to be left in its present state of interpretation,
little justification appears for a determination that section 5 of the Trade
Commission Act should also be divorced from competitive injury require
ments.
It is precisely the competitive injury question that was originally dele
gated to the expertise of the Trade Commission.74 It seems strange, indeed,
now to have an administrative agency applying per se provisions of a dis
criminatory pricing act. As has been mentioned, per se interdiction is pre
cisely the result of using sections of Robinson-Patman in isolatio"h from the
competitive injury requirements of 2(a) and, in some instances, from the
meeting of competition defense of 2 (b). It is submitted that, if the Robinson
Patman Act is reducible to per se rules then the time for administrative
intervention is over and enforcement should be left to the Justice Depart
ment and to private litigation in order to allow the Trade Commission to
concentrate on problems which are more in need of expert economic analy
sis. As presently applied to many discriminatory pricing cases, the act would
seem to presuppose an investigative rather than economic expertise.
It has been suggested that the Robinson-Patman Act be repealed in light
of its grotesqueness and the fact that the Sherman Act can be used, in those
cases which are economically significant, to accomplish the same result.75
One sub-section seems without champion.76 ,\Vhatever the outcome, it
would seem that in section 5, the Trade Commission has an appropriate
weapon in the discriminatory pricing field.
'Without resolving the controversy over the application of section 5 to
incipient Clayton Act violations, it is clear that in those cases in which price
71. The mainstream may have been somewhat diverted by the recent Radiant Burn
ers v. People's Gas Light and Coke Co., 81 Sup. Ct. 365 (1961), but it seems unlikely that
the ultimate direction will be much changed.
72. An'y GEN. NAT'L COlltM. ANTITRUST REp. 190 -191 (1955).
73. FTC v. Simplicity Patterns, 360 U.S. 55 (1959); if the courts ultimately uphold
the Exquisite Form Brassiere determination (see notes 23 and 24 supra, and accompanying
text) 2(d) will become as rigid as 2(C).
74. This appears from the debates accompanying passage of the Federal Trade Com
mission Act. On the one hand there was discussion of the body of law known as "unfair
competition," not here relevant. On the other, the emerging antitrust policy was dis
cussed. While the discussion showed little consensus on how the Commission's power was
circumscribed, there was almost unanimity that the Commission would be enabled to
ferret out anti-competitive conduct. See Montague, Unfair Methods of Competition, 25
YALE L.J. 20 (1915).
75. Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at
Robinson·Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929 (1951).
76. § 2(C). See An'y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. ANTITRUST REP. 190'191 (1955).
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discrimination is used either by the seller or by the customer in such a way
as to create a monopoly, the act is violative of section 5, because violative
of the Sherman Act. It is equally clear that the conduct may be apprehended
during the incipiency of the monopoly. In appropriate cases, section 5 also
enables the Commission to prohibit pricing arrangements under the stand
ard of section 1 of the Sherman Act. In any of these cases, based as they are
on economic findings in determinations that types of conduct tend to be
anti-competitive, the FTC might well make real contributions to the rather
befuddled field of discriminatory pricing. Instead of hiding behind a mis
interpreted act to strike down conduct without apparent examination of its
economic justification, it might supply the one facet of its expertise that is
not equally available to the courts through other means.
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